Key Points for Strengthening the CMIM

1. Strengthening Crisis Resolution Mechanism(CRM)

i)  Size

a. To double the total size of CMIM from the current US$120bn to US$240bn while keeping the current share of financial contributions and voting power among the member countries the same

ii) IMF De-linked Portion

b. To increase the IMF de-linked portion to 30% in 2012 with a view to increasing it to 40% in 2014 subject to review should conditions warrant

iii) Maturity, Supporting period and Monitoring

c. IMF linked portion: To lengthen the maturity period from 90 days to 1 year with 2 renewals, totaling up to 3 years in supporting period

d. IMF de-linked portion: To lengthen the maturity from 90 days to 6 months with 3 renewals, totaling up to 2 years in supporting period

e. To conduct monitoring on a bi-annual basis

iv) Name

f. To adopt “CMIM Stability Facility (CMIM-SF)” as the name for CRM

2. Introducing Crisis Prevention Function(CPF)

i) Introduction

a. To introduce one simplified crisis prevention facility

ii) Qualifications and Conditionality

b. To allow Executive Level Decision Making Body (ELDMB, Deputies’ Level Meeting) to flexibly apply the 5 qualification criteria, which are stipulated below, as ex-ante qualifications and ex-post conditionality after considering the economic reports by the requesting country and analyses by AMRO/ADB/IMF as the basis for the decision

< 5 qualification criteria > 

(i) External position and market access

(ii) Fiscal policy

(iii) Monetary policy

(iv) Financial sector soundness and supervision

(v) Data adequacy

iii) Name

c. To adopt “CMIM Precautionary Line (CMIM-PL)” as the name for CPF

iv) Duration of Access, Arrangement period, Maturity and Monitoring

d. To set the Duration of Access of CMIM-PL at 6 months with 3 renewals, totaling 2 years in arrangement period

e. To set the Maturity at 6 months for the IMF de-linked portion and 1 year for the IMF linked portion

f. To conduct monitoring on a bi-annual basis

v) Commitment Fee

g. To introduce the commitment fee of 0.15% to CMIM-PL, in principle

vi) Relationship with CMIM-SF

h. The total amount that can be drawn by each member country, either for prevention or resolution purposes, should be within the maximum swap amount set aside for that country

i. To restrict dual-drawing from both CMIM-SF and CMIM-PL

j. To replace the CMIM-PL with CMIM-SF if any CMIM-PL recipient party is hit with crisis and needs additional support, depending on the decision made by ELDMB

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